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in the Utah Court of Appeals
FRANKLIN CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Appellate Case No. 20100228-CA
Trial Court No. 050700241

vs.
BLAINE J. HANNEY, etal.
Defendants/Appellees.

Reply Brief of Cross-Appellees
Argument
Piaintiffs'/Cross-Appellees' brief is a pastiche of what-ifs, might-have-beens, and
maybes. Plaintiff/Cross-Appellee studiously ignores what has actually occurred. It is
undisputed that the Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint seeking a judicial
foreclosure of Blaine and Shirley Hanney's interest in the property. First Amended
Complaint, R. at 29, 34, and 37. At no point during the process of this litigation has
Plaintiff ever indicated that it intended to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure.1
Moreover, Plaintiff sought a judicial foreclosure as its remedy following the trial.
At the conclusion of the litigation, in its written closing argument, Plaintiff sought
Consequently this court should entered [sic] an order and judgment that
(a) the Bank One Trustee has a valid lien on the property; (b) the Bank
One Trust Deed is in default; and (c) Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose the

1.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Default, a step preparatory to the commencement
of a non-judicial foreclosure on 3 February 2003. Subsequently, Plaintiff fiied the
present action, on 6 May 2005. R. at 1. At no point during the present litigation has
Plaintiff ever indicated any intent to pursue a non-judicial foreclosure.
1
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Bank One Trust Deed to satisfy the amounts due and owing under the
Bank One Trust Deed, including interest and attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in the action.
R. at 1080.

Plaintiff now ignores its demand for judicial foreclosure as a mechanism to

escape the consequences of its evidentiary failings. Plaintiff's effort should be seen for
the feckless struggle it is.
Not until Defendants/Cross-Appellants, in response to this request, pointed out
that the Plaintiff had utterly failed to adduce evidence of the amount due and owing
under the Trust Deed, did Plaintiff seek to re-open the evidence. Absent proof of the
amount owing as of a date certain and interest rates, Plaintiff cannot prevail on a
judicial foreclosure. Utah law is clear that a judgment of foreclosure "shall include" "the
amount due, with costs and disbursements." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901(2).
It is elementary that in order for a court to make a "finding," a court must have
sufficient evidence upon which to base such a finding. In response, Plaintiff makes an
outre argument: "there is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-901 et seq. or the case
law cited by Defendants requiring such evidence to be presented at trial." Reply Brief of
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 19-20. Since the mortgage foreclosure statute
required a judgment to include a finding of "the amount due," one is left to wonder, from
Plaintiffs argument, exactly when and where Plaintiff would present such evidence? Of
course, Plaintiff pursued a similar approach through summary judgment; which the trial
court denied. With the denial of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, trial became
the sole process to present evidence. On some level, this concept is so elementary
that it cannot be gainsaid; indeed, Utah R. Civ. P. 43 expressly so directs ("[i]n all trials,
the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court"). Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)
2
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impliedly requires that findings of fact be predicated upon evidence presented in open
court. Evidence is presented to the court at trial and not in some other forum.
At trial, Plaintiff admits that the sole evidence presented at trial even touching the
issue of the amount of the indebtedness was trial Exhibit 59. Reply Brief of Appellant
and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 20. A copy of Exhibit 59 was attached to the Brief of
Appellee and Cross-Appellant as Appendix L. Exhibit 59-pages long, but with a short,
ambiguous three-line statement-is insufficient in any event. It simply provides, in
pertinent part:
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When the Plaintiff introduced this exhibit, it did not focus a single question on this figure
and did not use this exhibit in any sense to establish the amount owing under the Trust
Deed. Indeed, a review of the transcript reveals that all of the questioning regarding
Exhibit 59 was directed to different issues. R. at 385, Vol. I, 259-62; R. at 1386, Vol. II,
6-10. Moreover, there is no basis from the evidence for the court to conclude whether
this figure represents a principle figure, principle with interest, principle with interest as
of a date certain, or some other and different amount.
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that this same figure was produced by Plaintiff in
initial disclosures and in other material. None of these materials were ever presented to
3
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the trial court as trial evidence or subjected to any cross-examination. Plaintiff also
makes much of the fact that Blaine Hanney did not question or contradict these figures.
The answer for his failure to ask any questions is obvious: Blaine Hanney had no
knowledge of the Trust Deed at all, much less of payments that Shirley Hanney might
have made against it. Blaine Hanney, having no knowledge of the Trust Deed at all,
had no knowledge as to how payments were applied or other figures calculated. Blaine
Hanney was not in a position to contest the amounts owing.
Plaintiff, as the party seeking affirmative recovery, it bore the burden of proof on
all issues at trial relative to its requested relief. Green v. Nelson, 232 P.2d 776, 781
(Utah 1951 )("as a general rule in actions for breach of contract, he who seeks
damages, bears the burden of proof). See also Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d, § 2770 ("a plaintiff in a declaratory action who voluntarily
goes forward and attempts to prove his case will be held to have assumed the risk of
nonpersuasion."). A judicial foreclosure partakes of aspects of both contract and
declaratory actions: a breach of an agreement is the central finding given rise to a right
to recover; the court must also declare the amount owing under the mortgage or trust
deed which is to be foreclosed. Under any view, the burden of proof was always
squarely on the Plaintiff with respect to the judicial foreclosure.2
The pre-trial order did not shift the burden. The total indebtedness, interest, and
related figures were not stipulated issues of fact. These items of fact were essential

2.
Defendant Hanney readily acknowledges that the burden of proof on his
counterclaim for a declaration that the trust deed was invalid was always on him. The
trial court found that Defendant had carried this burden.
4
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elements of proof that could be proved in any number of ways. The mere fact that
Plaintiff failed to either (1) obtain a stipulation or (2) identify them as contested issues of
fact did not discharge Plaintiff's duty in any degree. Utah law is clear that the facts
justifying judicial foreclosure must be predicated upon "evidence in the record."
Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1984); Jensen v.
Liechtenstein, 145 P. 1036, 1038 (Utah 1914).
Plaintiff also suggests that because Defendant Blaine Hanney did not controvert
this issue strongly in the pre-trial stages of this litigation, or during trial, that this
somehow indicates his agreement with the figure. Nothing could be further from the
truth. When the Plaintiffs initial disclosures failed to list any bank officer as a potential
witness, and when subsequent answers to interrogatories did not list bank officers as
witnesses, Defendant Blaine Hanney made the strategic decision to simply wait and
see what evidence Plaintiff's adduced at trial in order to determine how he shouid react.
Once the final pre-trial order was signed, without a disclosure of additional witnesses or
a stipulation as to the amount owing, Defendant was prepared to address the issue
during trial. Plaintiff's complete failure to present evidence, however, made the issue
moot. Absent evidence of indebtedness as of a date certain, Plaintiff loses.
It is startling how easily Plaintiff might have proved this point. Assuming
$245,590.25 is the principle, as of a date certain, Plaintiff needed merely to produce
self-authenticating affidavits from its predecessor-in-interest and itself. Utah R.
Evd. 803(6), 902(9), and 902(H). Plaintiff appears to argue that since the point might
have easily have been proved, it is excused from proof. Of course, the converse is the
true point: since the matter was so easily provable, the failure to offer proof is even less
5
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excusable. Indeed, it is the complexity of the proof that justified the re-opener in
A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 1999 UT 87, ffij 22-24,
977 P.2d 518. Here, plaintiff's proof was simplicity itself; the failure of that proof is
perplexing.
This case is remarkably similar to Tanqaro v. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah
1962). In Tanqaro, Plaintiff mistakenly sued on a satisfied note. After trial, Plaintiff
realized the error and sought to reopen the evidence. The trial court denied the motion
to re-open, and the Supreme Court noted that the trial court had not abused its
discretion. Tanqaro, 373 P.2d at 391. Additionally, however, the Utah Supreme Court
noted that "[i]t is elementary that the trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial"
absent meeting the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 59. Presumably, the same applies
to re-opening evidence after each side has rested. Here, no attempt to comply with
Rule 59 was made or even articulated.
Plaintiff simply took no care whatsoever for the basic elements of proof of its
case. It was only after the evidence was complete-and both sides rested-, and
Plaintiff's failure was made clear, that Plaintiff then sought to re-open the evidence.
Plaintiff's motion was too little to late, and it was an abuse of discretion to open the
evidence at that point.3
Two other points are also bewildering. First, Plaintiff asserts that it offered an
explanation for its failure to present the needed evidence, citing to the record at pages
3.
Even when given the opportunity to re-open the evidence, the Plaintiff
undertook no effort to actually present the evidence at trial. Plaintiff did present to
Defendant a document similar to the one attached to Plaintiffs Reply Brief, and
Defendant promptly filed an objection to the document on hearsay grounds. R. at
1268-69.
6
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1144-46. Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, 22. A review of these
pages reveals nothing by way of an explanation for Plaintiff's failure to present
evidence. An adequate explanation is a condition precedent to re-opening the
evidence. United State v. Kithcast 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff was
never offered any explanation at all. Plaintiff cites the Record at pages 1144-46.
These pages are attached hereto as Exhibit B. A review will reveal no explanation at
all.
Second, Plaintiff continues to assert that the issue in question is a matter of
"simple math." Amazingly, although this matter was addressed at closing argument,
addressed a second time as part of the motion to re-open the evidence, and addressed
a third time in the appellate briefing, even at this stage, Plaintiff has never stated the
amount it beiieves to be due and owing under the Trust Deed. Moreover, Plaintiff
cannot so state without some indication of what the principle amount is, as of a date
certain. Without establishing that foundational issue, no "simple math" calculation is
possible. Even assuming that $245,590.25 is the amount owing under the trust deed
as of some date, what is that date? Interest owing cannot be calculated without
evidence of the date. Even with the reopening of the evidence, Plaintiff has never
presented any evidence whatsoever as of the date the interest runs from.
Accordingly, the trial court was left in an impossible position, had it determined to
rule in Plaintiff's favor. There was insufficient evidence from which to make the
required findings. It is not enough to find the principal amount, the trial court was also
required to find the interest. Interest, reflecting the time-value of money, requires proof
of dates. No where in the record are the required dates ever expressed. Even after the
7
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evidence was reopened, Plaintiff faiied to present the required evidence. The trial
court's decision to re-open the evidence was erroneous and an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case precludes any further recovery for
exactly the reasons articulated by Defendant Hanney in his written closing argument.
R. at 1098-1102.

Conclusion
Plaintiff may well be correct that it would be a matter of relatively simple
evidentiary presentation to establish the amount due and owing under the Trust Deed.
The fact that this may be correct makes Plaintiff's failure to present this evidence all the
more problematic. The trial court erred in re-opening the evidence. The trial court's
decision should be reversed, and the conclusion of the trial court should be affirmed.
Alternatively, should the trial court's decision be reversed, the trial court's decision to
reopen should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of Defendant.
DATED this / £

day of November, 2010.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

^Brad C. Sfrnith
Attorney for Defendants Hanney
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